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Introduction
The puzzle of IPOs pricing both in the short-run and in the long-run has become a leading example of pervasive market inefficiency (Ibbotson et al., 1994) . While the most striking and widely diffused empirical regularity is the initial underpricing 1 , the evidence on IPOs long-run performance is mixed, although severe underperformance has been reported in the major stock markets. This suggests that investors should buy a portfolio of IPO shares and sell them in the short-run, to take over the "money left on the table" (Loughran and Ritter, 2001 ) by the issuing firm and avoid longrun losses.
In this paper we aim at exploring IPOs performance in the long-run on the Italian Stock Exchange.
In particular, we consider if the long run relative performance may be predicted at the IPO, by looking either at the firm's characteristics, or at the market general momentum.
We collect data for all the IPOs issued on the Italian Stock Exchange from 1985 to 1999 and
analyze the market prices in the 3 years following the listing for a sample of 150 IPOs, compared to the market performance.
We show that the mean buy-and-hold abnormal return is equal to +1.87% after one year, -6.40%
after two years and -23.01% after three years. Yet, we highlight that IPOs in the '80s do not significantly underperform the market, while IPOs in the late '90s do exhibit significantly negative abnormal returns. The underperformance characterizes in particular industrial companies, and we detect a significant negative correlation between the long run returns and the initial IPO flipping, this suggesting that some investors possess superior information about IPO firms and take advantage of the initial underpricing.
This paper is divided in five sections. Section 2 highlights the recent literature about IPOs performance in the long-run and points out the methodological problem of defining appropriate benchmarks to measure it. In Section 3 we give a short description of the going public institutional framework in Italy. Section 4 shows the results of the empirical analyses. In Section 5 the findings of the analysis are summarized and some concluding remarks are drawn.
Do IPOs really underperform in the long-run ?
The results of empirical studies on the long-run performance of IPOs are not homogeneous. Table I reports the most recent evidence we found about IPOs long-run performance in the world. Table I In some countries the long-run performance is more pronounced than in others. Carter et al. (1998) , Hanley (1993) , Levis (1993) and Ritter (1991) analyze US and UK IPOs and highlight that they significantly underperform both the market index and comparable firms. In Germany recent IPOs seem to perform neutrally compared with different control portfolios (Sapusek, 1997) ; in Sweden IPOs returns in 3 years do not significantly differ from market returns (Loughran et al., 1994) . At the extreme, in Turkey post-listing positive abnormal returns are detected (Kiymaz, 1997) , like in other developing countries such as China and Korea.
Yet, the conclusions about abnormal IPOs performance in the long run are sensitive to the methodology employed. For example, when size-and book-to-market matching is used, no evidence of underperformance is found for US IPOs (Brav and Gompers, 1997) .
To test whether a market is inefficient in pricing shares, one must know what "normal" returns should be, in order to determine if the actual returns deviate form this benchmark (Loughran and Ritter, 2000) . Since normative pricing models, such as the CAPM, have little empirical support, there is no general consensus on how to measure long-term abnormal returns. Fama (1998) argues that the tests based on the magnitude of abnormal returns are rarely robust to alternative referring benchmark: they simply verify whether any patterns that exist are being captured by other known patterns. Moreover, statistical significance levels are, for some methodologies, difficult to compute (Brav, 2000; Lyon et al., 1999) .
Current empirical research on IPOs, in measuring long-run performance, adopt several benchmarks:
(i) the market return, as measured by official indexes, (ii) the market return adjusted for risk, for size or book-to-market 2 , and (iii) a portfolio of comparable listed firms. These benchmarks are compared to portfolio of IPOs, equally weighting (EW) or value weighting (VW) the new issues.
Adopting the market return as a benchmark causes a test to be biased towards no abnormal returns because the benchmark is composed also by the IPOs firms. Coherently Loughran and Ritter (2000) find substantially greater underperformance using decontaminated instead of the simple market
benchmark. Yet, matching by size and book-to-market is empirically motivated rather than theoretically , and this provides no evidence for or against market efficiency.
However, it makes sense to point out the variety of factors that are correlated to the long term return of IPO stocks. A piece of the literature generally suggests that the market is not at long-term equilibrium when pricing young issues, but it realizes its mistakes slowly, adjusting prices as the issue mature. Miller (1977) explains IPO underperformance assuming divergence of investor opinions, under the condition of no short sales. Thus, a negative relationship between long-run performance and ex ante uncertainty should stand 3 . Morris (1996) also shows that heterogeneity of beliefs can support speculative bubbles and over-valued IPOs immediately after the issuance, relative to the long-run value. Lewis et al. (2000) underline that investors purchase IPO shares assuming all new issues will survive and are not adequately compensated for the risk of failure. In fact, they find that the average issue underperformance is mainly driven by "busted" IPOs.
Loughrand and Ritter (1995) hypothesize that a "window of opportunity" exists in which investors are over-optimistic about the issuing firm's value. Rajan and Servaes (1997) state that security analysts are systematically overoptimistic about the earnings potential and long-term growth prospects of recent IPOs. It is common belief that analysts' forecast tend to exceed the actual profits figure and prospects, especially if they are affiliated with underwriters. Teoh et al. (1998) find evidence suggesting that naïve investors may be systematically fooled by earnings management operations of "window dressing", aimed at reporting earnings in excess of cash flows by taking opportunistic positive accruals. Information asymmetry exists between investors and issuers at the time of the IPO. If buyers rely on earnings reported in the prospectus, but are unaware that they are inflated by accruals, they will pay too high a price. The authors find a significative ability of discretionary accruals to predict IPO stock price underperformance, suggesting that as information about the firm is revealed over time, investors may recognise that earnings are not maintaining their momentum, and adjust prices. In fact, when inflating accruals, firms borrow income from future periods so that managers cannot overstate earnings over long periods of time without being detected. The same results are obtained by Roosenboom et al. (1999) who analyze a sample of Dutch IPOs: they find that IPO firms do manage their earnings during the fiscal year of the issue; moreover companies which lavish on discretionary accruals experience worse long-run stock price performance. Consistently with the frameworks ahead, several studies document that IPOs operating performance decade after the listing.
Wen (1999) provides a rational explanation for the IPO underperformance. Assuming investor heterogeneity, share-supply and short-sale restrictions he builds a model in which some investors must have special reasons to want to hold IPOs (over-optimism, preference for skewed returns, residual risk linked to technological change and innovation), but their beliefs are not narrowing over time after. He demonstrates that in this world the expected rate of return from IPOs can also be below the risk-free rate and predicts that small IPOs tend to have poorer performance. In this vein, Ammermann (2000) states that the long run bad performance is determined by the expiration of the growth options embodied by the firms at the IPO.
Is the initial market performance related to subsequent performance ? Ibbotson et al. (1994) and Carter et al. (1998) suggest that good firms underprice their shares to signal quality, as manifest by superior aftermarket performance. On the contrary Shiller (1990) argues that the IPO market is subject to fads opportunistically exploited by intermediates through underpriced issues 4 . Such temporary fads must eventually fade away, resulting in long-run bad performance 5 . Loughran and Ritter (2000) posit that underperformance is more severe in high-volume trading periods than in low-volume periods, consistently with the supply response hypothesis by (Ritter, 1991) . Krigman et al. (1999) find an interesting link between the initial trading volume and the long-run performance: first-day "winners" (i.e. underpriced IPOs) continue to be winners over the first year, and first day "dogs" (i.e. IPOs with negative or zero initial returns) continue to be relative dogs. An exception are extra-hot IPOs (i.e. severely underpriced IPOs) which provide the worst future performance. Since on the first day of listing they observe large informed investors (flippers) selling issues that have the worst future performance, they conclude that flipping predicts bad long-run performance. Houge et al. (1999) also posit the long-term forecasting ability of flipping, but exclude information advantages of large traders. Simply they posit that the more divergent the investors' expectations about the issue (measured by flipping, by the opening delay and by the size of the opening spread), the poorer the long-term performance.
A number of papers point out a significantly high correlation between long-term returns and ownership structure. Leland and Pyle (1977) predict that firms with greater insider selling of secondary shares at the IPO should have worse long-run performance, consistently with the agencytheory, motivated by increased extraction of private benefits by the controlling shareholder (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) . Agency problems may arise in IPOs when insider ownership is diluted. Jain and Kini (1994) argue that the bad long-term performance of IPOs can be partly explained by the worsening of managerial incentives following the issue. On the contrary Mikkelson et al. (1997) and Goergen (1998, On the contrary Hamao et al. (1998) find the long-run performance of venture-backed IPOs to be no better than that of other IPOs. Interestingly enough, splitting the sample they find that firms with a venture backing from securities company subsidiaries perform significantly worse than other IPOs, suggesting the existence of conflict of interests.
The long-run aftermarket performance of IPOs is certainly affected also by underwriters and analyst activism. While in the short-run there is evidence of direct intervention on the open market, in the long-run research coverage and analysts recommendation provide the market with information. Michaely and Womack (1999) show that IPO stocks that underwriter analysts recommend perform more poorly than recommendations by unaffiliated brokers, this suggesting that underwriting relationship biases analysts' coverage. Megginson et al. (2000) examine a survey of empirical studies on the privatization of state-owned enterprises and find significantly positive excess returns in the long-run.
Last, institutional bindings and rules seem to be important in driving the long-run overperformance in developing countries, as highlighted by Wong and Xie (1999) .
The going public process in Italy
The going public process in Italy starts with a firm and an advisor selecting a Stock Market, choosing the flotation mechanism and estimating an offer price range 6 . A "book-running" manager and the co-managers (if any) are given the responsibility to assembly a syndicate (lead by the underwriter) to assist in the public offering of the shares. A letter of intent is drawn protecting the underwriter in the event the offer is withdrawn, determining the gross spread and eventually a commitment by the company to grant an overallotment option to the underwriter, typically 15% of the total issue. The most diffused kinds of agreements in Italian IPOs are the Firm Commitment and the Stand-by Agreement. With a Firm Commitment the investment bank guarantees to purchase the whole issue from the corporation and then re-offer the shares to the public. With a Stand-by Agreement the intermediate agrees to purchase the newly issued shares not subscribed by the investors, to a limited amount. The Best Effort Agreement, which does not guarantee that enough buyers will be found to sell the entire offering, is almost never used in Italy 7 .
After the authorities' approval 8 , a legal notice and a prospectus are published specifying the number of shares sold, the price at which these shares will be sold and the date of the listing. An intermediate is selected as the "sponsor", and certifies that the issuing firm complies with the listing requirements.
The shares marketed through a public offer may be existing shares (OPV, Offerta Pubblica di
Vendita) or newly issued shares (OPS, Offerta Pubblica di Sottoscrizione) or both (OPVS, Offerta
Pubblica di Vendita e di Sottoscrizione). Voting, non voting or restricted voting shares may be offered to the public.
From 1985 to 1994 almost all IPOs adopted the fixed-price issue procedure, i.e. the (fixed) price of the shares was published in the prospectus. A few IPOs adopted an auction-like procedure, in which competitive price-quantity bids were collected from investors. Actually this procedure has been no longer adopted for an IPO in Italy 9 after 1986. Table II , where the number of cases excluded is also reported. Table II Most of the IPOs went public during the late '80s, to coincide with the bullish momentum of stock exchanges, and during the late '90s, taking advantage of tax benefits and market reforms described in the previous Section.
From several public sources we collected the market prices and the accounting data about the sample firms relatively to the periods before and immediately after the offering, and about the placement's strategies and techniques.
Among the IPOs of the survey 19 offerings are privatization operations and in 32 cases the issuing firm belongs to business groups whose holding company is already listed (equity carve-outs). The latter IPOs are essentially related to the period between 1985 and 1988 and involve almost all the larger business groups listed on the Stock Market in those years 12 . Remarkably, they represent about 50% of the IPOs in the same period.
With reference to the privatization operations, in the first period banks and assurance companies are especially at stake, whereas in the second public utilities are involved above all 13 .
Considering the sector subdivision of the sample, we referred to a classification adopted by the Italian Stock Exchange (Borsa Italiana SpA ), which distinguishes among three "macrosectors", i.e.
"industrial" securities, "financial" securities and "utilities". Table III shows that the majority of the IPOs refers to "industrial" firms, even if "financial" companies have a relevant importance. Table III Some descriptive statistics about the sample, which will be related to the long run performance, are summarized in Tables IVa and Ivb.   Tables IVa and IVb First, it is evident a strong scattering of the firms' size; this is due to sectorial peculiarities, as
shown by the comparison between the mean and median data of banks and insurance companies and the data of industrial firms, and to the presence of very large IPOs (Enimont, ENI, Mediaset, ENEL). The mean age of the firms is about 44 years, which is remarkably high if compared to US IPOs but similar to other European samples 14 . The fraction of equity capital held by the controlling shareholder after the IPO is on average equal to 61.64%, not sensibly different from other markets 15 .
Notice that at the IPO most of the shares (on the average 60.60%) are often assigned to institutional investors.
The short-run performance of the Italian IPOs considered in the sample has been already analyzed by Arosio et al. (2000) . They find a mean (median) underpricing equal to24.78% (8.95%).
The methodology we adopt to measure the long run performance is the computation of both the buyand-hold returns (BHRs) and buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs):
where r it is the performance of IPO i in month t (measured on a 21-trading days basis) and r bt is the performance of the benchmark market index (the historical MIB index) during the same period.
While BHRs measure the IPO performance in the long run, BHARs measure the long run underperformance or overperformance with respect to the market portfolio. According to this approach, we assume that capital gains are reinvested periodically in the same stock rebalancing the portfolio. The method is different from the determination of cumulated abnormal returns (CARs) since in this last case investors are supposed to maintain the same composition of their portfolio thus selling the more profitable stock to invest in the less profitable; yet this strategy seems to be unrealistic. Tables V and VI   Tables V and VI reports the monthly data about the IPOs mean equally-weighted performance (BHRs and BHARs) for all the sample. Table V highlights that the median BHR is negative: this means that more than 50% of the IPOs have a negative return, independently from the market performance. Table VI shows that on the average the IPOs return, compared to the market, is negative, albeit a few companies exhibit a brilliant performance. The one-year mean (median) relative performance for 150 IPOs (listed from 1985 to 1999) is equal to +1.87% (-12.50%) Note that the data are not available for all firms, since in some cases (the most recent IPOs) the market prices are not available, and in other cases the firms exit from the market. Therefore, we report in Tables VII and VIII the statistics about homogeneous samples.   Tables VII and VIII After two years, a sample of 126 IPOs (listed between 1985 and 1998) does not significantly underperform the market (mean relative performance is -6.40%). Yet after three years (in this case the sample is made up by 110 IPOs from 1985 to 1997) the abnormal mean performance is -23.01%
(significantly negative). The mean and median three-years IPO underperformance is also shown in If we split the sample by listing year we find quite a remarkable asymmetry in the results. Figure 2 reports the mean BHARs computed after having grouped the IPOs by listing year. Note that 1985
IPOs tend to underperform the market after one year, but the mean return improves in the following years. The other companies gone public in the late '80s on the average outperform the index. In the '90s the IPOs performance is quite worse: neglecting the early '90s (due to the scarce number of IPOs), offerings from 1995 to 1997 substantially underperform the benchmark, and the result is dramatically evident after one year, as most of these IPOs leave more than 50% wealth relative to the market. Finally, IPOs in 1998 and 1999 seem to be rewarded by investors, probably in coincidence with the "hot issue market" documented by Loughran and Ritter (2001) . Table IX shows that the long run underperformance is particularly severe for industrial companies, while on the contrary media companies and utilities have been welcome by the market, especially during the "new economy" bubble in 1998 and 1999. Other firms' characteristics (such as the firm's age and size, the market/book ratio at the listing) have been considered, but none of them seem to be correlated with the long run abnormal return. Table IX Table X splits the sample among equity carve outs (ECOs), privatization IPOs (PIPOs) and other IPOs. Table X Although the differences between the three categories are not significant, the mean abnormal return of ECOs and PIPOs is better than other IPOs.
In Tables XI and XII the correlation between the long run abnormal return, the initial IPO underpricing (first-day market return) and the initial trading volume of IPOs (relative to the offer size). The IPO underpricing seems not be significantly related to the long run performance.
Overpriced IPOs seem to have a better long run performance, compared to IPOs exhibiting an initial underpricing, but the worst relative performance is register for firms with a "low" first-day return.
On the contrary, the initial trading volume is significantly and negatively related to the long run underperformance. The correlation is remarkable both considering the performance over two or three years, and the relative turnover after one, five or ten days of trading.
Tables XI and XII
Since the initial turnover may be related to the "flipping" activity (i.e. investors selling IPO shares in order to take advantage of the initial underpricing), we may also hypothesize that some investors possess superior information than the market, and are able to point out the worst IPOs. Therefore they divest as soon as possible their shares in order to capitalize any gain, and the liquidity of the stock is negatively influenced.
Finally, Table XIII reports a multivariate regression in which the determinants of the IPOs long run underperformance over three years are investigated. We introduce two firm-related measures (namely the gross SALES and the fraction of equity capital owned by controlling shareholders after the IPO, OWNERSHIP), and other market-related variables (the MARKET_INDEX return and VOLATILITY over 90 days before the offering, as well as the turnover as a FLIPPING proxy). We test if there is any size-effect in the long run performance, and if the ownership structure is relevant.
We further hypothesize that the market momentum may influence the long run return, for example is firms opportunistically take advantage of bullish markets to go public. Table XIII The results suggest that firm-related variables are nor significant, while the market sentiment is strongly related to the long run performance. It is confirmed that the turnover is positively related with the long run underperformance. Both the market index return and market volatility before the IPO are positively correlated, and this represents a further evidence to be investigated.
Concluding remarks
The evidence shows that the long run underperformance characterizes Italian IPOs in the 1990s, but not during the 1980s (when the initial underpricing has been larger, as documented by Arosio et al., 2000) . The negative return is particularly severe for companies listed from 1995 to 1997. What happened during those years in Italy ? The Exchange was demutualized, the number of firms going public sensibly arose, the market index (as in the rest of the world) grew up and tax incentives boosted small industrial firms to go public. One of the most important effect seems to be the market momentum. IPO firms in Italy seem not to be able to follow bullish cycles, especially in traditional industrial sectors. It will be interesting to compare them to similar firms already listed, in order to point out the determinants of the relative underperformance. This represents a priority in the authors' agenda.
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